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Jurisdiction
The court has jurisdiction under Utah Code section 78A-4-103(2)(j).
Statement of the Issues
On the morning of August 7, 1996, Jamie Weiss was killed in her home. Over the
next 11 years, the police focused their investigation exclusively on Billy Charles and
ignored other leads. For example, the police conducted various DNA tests—one on a
sample taken from a letter confessing to the crime—but once those tests excluded Billy,
the police ignored the suggestion of the crime lab that the test results be compared with
the national database to determine whose DNA it was. And the police did not perform
DNA testing on 2 hairs in Jamie's hand once visual tests determined that the hairs did not
belong to Billy. Yet even with their myopic focus on Billy, when the State charged him
with murder in 2007, the charges were based only upon the very circumstantial evidence
the State had in 1996.
Despite the lack of any new evidence, the State's case did strengthen over those
11 years. Evidence favorable to the defense was lost, a critical witness for the defense
died, and the defense could no longer effectively investigate alternative theories the
police had ignored. And by the time of trial, the State did have new evidence—jailhouse
informant Troy Miller. Mr. Miller had the good fortune of having no fewer than 4
prisoners confessing murders to him weeks before his sentencing. While the prosecutor
insisted that Mr. Miller had not been promised favorable treatment for his testimony, as it
turned out, Mr. Miller's sentencing was continued until he testified against Billy and the
prosecutor in Mr. Miller's case then endorsed a sentence less severe than the sentencing
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recommendation. In this case, the court refused to give defense counsel's jury instruction
warning of the problems inherent with such jailhouse informant testimony.
Based upon circumstantial evidence considered insufficient to bring charges for
11 years, and a jailhouse informant so lacking in credibility that he should not have been
permitted to testify, the jury convicted Billy of Jamie's murder. Assuming there is
sufficient evidence to support a beyond-a-reasonable-doubt conviction, at best, the State's
case hangs by an evidentiary thread, making nearly any error prejudicial.
In addition to the jury instruction error, there were plenty of other errors to warrant
reversal. Trial counsel's failure to provide adequate notice of witnesses precluded him
from presenting evidence corroborating Billy's story that Jamie helped him with his truck
when he left for work the morning she was killed, something that permitted the
prosecutor to say in closing that Billy was making up that story. Trial counsel also failed
to present evidence that there was a car parked in the driveway after Billy left for work,
an important fact since Billy sold illegal drugs and his safe was discovered open and
empty the day Jamie was killed. All of this evidence the jury never heard spoke to the
crucial issue in the case—the time of death—and supported Billy's story that he was at
work when Jamie was killed. Given how little evidence links Billy to her death, these
errors are sufficient to warrant a new trial.
Issue 1: Whether the defendant's constitutional right to due process was violated
where (i) the State delayed filing charges for 11 years; (ii) the charges were premised on
evidence known 11 years earlier; (iii) key evidence was lost during the 11-year delay;
(iv) a key witness who could corroborate the defendant's story died during those
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11 years; and (v) the State's investigation ignored all evidence implicating someone other
than the defendant. This issue was preserved at R. 349:146, 148, 150, 163, 166; 401:40.
Standard of Review; "Constitutional issues, including questions regarding due
process, are questions of law that we review for correctness." Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT
82, Tj 25, 100 P.3d 1177.
Issue 2; Whether trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective in failing to present
evidence corroborating the defendant's story about mechanical problems with his truck
and failing to present evidence that a third party was at the crime scene after the
defendant left for work.
Standard of Review: Ineffective assistance of counsel claim raised for the first
time on appeal is reviewed for correctness. State v. Perry, 2009 UT App 51, TJ 9, 204
P.3d 880.
Issue 3: Whether the trial court erred in refusing to give the defendant's requested
instruction concerning how to weigh jailhouse informant testimony, where the informant
had an extensive criminal history of dishonesty and claimed that 4 different prisoners
confessed murders to him just before his sentencing. This issue was preserved at
R. 349:130.
Standard of Review: The refusal to give a jury instruction presents a question of
law reviewed for correctness. Ramon v. Farr. 770 P.2d 131, 133 (Utah 1989).

Determinative Provisions
Attached at Addendum B
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Statement of the Case
I

Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings
iu i ^ o ,

old RilK

Jamie Weiss, and their 2-year-old son, Jesse

>M \H J UU

« \ *-* 14 vi

• *'

-996,

nail appointment. (R , 2;

342:158.) She found Jamie submerged in the bathtub. (R. 2.) Jamie could not be
revived. (R 342:1.92.) I he medical examiner ruled the death a homicide and the cause
of death blunt force trauma and asphyxiatioi

*

*i,

and exclusively, focused on Billy Charles. (R. 346:92-94; 342:197-98, 2 H \ n h

him start his truck before he left for work. (R. 3.) The prosecutor did not charge Billy

On November 29, 2007, the State charged Billy with first tici'ire Iclom nuinlci
I \< I I h»?* 1 1 years, the police considered this a "cold case," apparently meaning the
State lacked sufficient o. idnu< ^ in \\\\\\ I Mini I tiim

il< -' IK hi,' ( \ , juii

I iilic

investigation, a year later the police put a recording device on Jamie's grave hoping to
i i'i ntdlUilli iTiittrv.iiit' iR UN lin i III lid i nil I he police sent physical evidence
they had gathered in 1997 for DNA testing in 2002 and 2007 hoping it would implicate
Bill) (R 348:163; 3 1 9 ; 6, 82, 8 ; .) It < lid i lot. Despite their efforts, the police never
obtained any new evidence implicating Billy Charles, WhenBilb

-

charged, all evidence included in the Information was known by the State 11 years
mi lin , (ill si jfkT Li in ni in \ <ir;il li i Is 1 1 ni
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Meanwhile, the police failed to send other physical evidence (hair in Jamie's hand
when she died) for DNA testing because they did not believe it contained Billy's DNA.
(R. 348:163; 349:76, 82, 87.) And as for the DNA testing they did do, once the testing
excluded Billy, the police failed to have the samples compared with the national database
to find out whose DNA it was, even though the crime lab suggested that they do so.
(R. 349:76-77, 80.) In addition, during the State's 11-year delay in bringing charges, a
witness died who was critical to corroborating Billy's story, the State lost key evidence,
and the ability to investigate people other than Billy evaporated. (R. 342:160-61;
348:180-81.)
On April 2, 2009, a jury convicted Billy of first degree felony murder.
(R. 349:211; 291.) Billy filed a motion to arrest judgment, which was denied on
September 30, 2009. (R. 375.) On October 1, 2009, the district court sentenced Billy to
5 years to life in the Utah State Prison. (R. 393.) This appeal followed.
II.

Statement of Facts
A.

The events of August 7,1996

At 4 p.m. on August 6, 1996, Billy Charles returned after work to the trailer he
shared with his girlfriend Jamie and their son Jesse. (R. 348:64.) Billy had been
borrowing his sister Lisa's car to get to work because he was having mechanical trouble
with the gear shift linkage of his vehicle, a 1972 Ford truck. (R. 342:175-76; 348:67-68,
70, 170.) Billy could not use Lisa's car the next day, so he, Jamie, and Jesse walked to
Jamie's grandmother Dora's house hoping to borrow her car for the next day. (R. 3;
348:64; 349:148-49.) Jamie's grandmother could not loan Billy her car, and she drove
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the family home at

.u. (R. 348:65; 349:150.) The family went to bed shortly

thereafter (R 3 it
The next morning, according to Billy, he got read) foi w ork and * oke Jai :t lie sc
that she could help him start his 1972 Ford truck. (R. 348:66.) Jamie's assistance was
in qui i rd IK I a lis* due hi litniunieai piohlcm ^uilli lh< li in I i IniLim1 llilh nu ikd
Jamie to push on the brake from inside the vehicle while Billy manually shifted the
transmission gears underneath the vehicle from park to reverse, and then after backing
out, shifting the gears while underneath the vehicle from reverse to drive. (R. 348:67.)
The vehicle had been pulled into the driveway and needed to be put into reverse gear to
•'

<

>h

^

underneath it. (R. 348:109.) Billy did not have to change the gears from outside the
tnui ml il n.ts p.nki <l in \\i\w (ill J il.it MJII.RX, such as ulitu lie was at work, \H WS.^X i
\ neighbor, Stephen Heidt, saw Billy outside that morning at 6 a.m., saw the truck
back out of the driveway, but did not sex Jamie 'R ^p-i<\ ?0-?1. 23-24. *n N
Mr. Heidt was making several trij

• -alio: -A -. -

i istalling car seats, ai id loading

his car to take his family on a trip to I impanogos Cave. (U. 347:20-21, 38-39, 42-43,
I11'1 I Mi I! Iniill U'slilU'd il \wv

ihsuluh I

onriT Ih il I iiiniii1

ilMIII lluu hcciiii i nil linn

and [he] just didn't see her because [he] was in the house.5 (R, 347:50.)
Vr ;" iiiid 10:30 a m Billy s sister I Jsa arrived to pick Jamie up for a nail
appointment. (R. 342:158, 161 ) She found the front door locked and 2-year-old Jesse in
the backyard unsupervised, without a diaper. (R 342:162-63.) The grass was wet and
she heard a stran

>

venting. (R. 342 I ()>,) She entered the trailer through the back door and discovered
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Jamie submerged in the bathtub in the guest bathroom. (R. 342:167-68, 170.) The water
was running and overflowing out of the tub. (R. 342:169-70.) Lisa lifted Jamie from the
tub and called 911. (R. 342:170-71.) The police and paramedics arrived, but Jamie could
not be revived. (R. 342:189, 192.) There were no obvious signs of injury, and the police
initially believed the death was an accidental drowning. (R. 342:192-93, 211.) By early
afternoon, the medical examiner had declared the cause of death a homicide.
(R. 342:213.) Police officers immediately focused on Billy Charles, and only Billy
Charles. (R. 342:213.)
No one could contact Billy at his job. (R. 348:210, 226.) Billy arrived home from
work at 3:30 in the afternoon. (R. 342:196.) He was on foot because his truck had
broken down. (R. 342:196; 348:72, 185.) When he arrived home, his family and 10 or
12 police officers were there. (R. 342:196; 348:211, 215.) Upon learning of Jamie's
death, Billy turned pale and he tried to rush through the police tape and enter his trailer.
(R. 342:212; 348:213-214, 230.) A melee between Billy's family and the police officers
ensued. (R. 342:199-200, 202.) Several family members, including 16-year-old Lisa
Charles, who had found Jamie that morning, were placed under arrest. (R. 342:200;
348:215-16,235.)
Billy voluntarily spoke with officers that afternoon and the following day.
(R. 348:63-64, 107, 134.) He consistently told the police that Jamie helped him start the
truck that morning before he left for work and explained why her assistance was
necessary. (R. 348:66-70, 109.) The police made no arrest Even though the police
uncovered no new evidence for more than 11 years, the State charged Billy with Jamie's
murder in 2007. (R. 1-4.)
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The State's Evidence
ii.il,, (lie ! Hale s only evidence against Billy was circumstantial, I isa t.'tiailcs
testified that she found the body and that her brother sounded normal when she spoke to
him that morning before he left for work (R 342:169, 177.) The neighbor, Mr. Heidt,
Icsfificd dial iir SAW \Y\U\ lr;m ill <(» J nil IIIIIIIMI II1..11I \\\\\U In did not MV lunik1 Jim tonlil
have been there. (R. 347:23-24, 50.)
' I lie t nedical exai 1:111 lei testified that tl le cai iseof death \ v as asphyxiation and blunt
force trauma to the head and extremities (R 346:25, 65.) While he testified that, in his
opinion, Jamie died prior to 6:30 o
she could have died as late as 8 a

conceded that by his calculations in 1996,
timetable confirm*

medical witness). 1 (R. 346:61,94-96, 102,

' • <*

* *u * ^• •• v < t
«• •

1 ' l

- T h e medical

exai 1 nil lei testifie d tl lat tl le tei 1 ij:: si ati 11 e • ;:>f
would have affected the calculations. (R. 346:100.) Moreover, the medical examiner
testified tl lat Jai 1 lie si lould ha\ e had "wasl icr womn-..- ' hands if she had been put in the
water prior to 6 a in. and that she did not have washer woman hands—indicating that she
was not placed in the tub until well after Billy left for work. (R. 346:63-64, 66-69.) Lisa
Charles testified that when she fbi 11. 1 :1 Jai t lie , si le w as coi 1 lpleteb si lbn lei gecl ii 1 tl le water.
(R .342:170.)

There are four methods for determining time of death, each providing only estimates
based upon many variables, (R 346:84, 115 ) The medical examiner could have
determined a more precise time of death by taking two potassium samples and
determining the rate at which Jamie's potassium levels were changing—which is a ste.^.x
rate after death—but he only took one sample, which meant that the rate of change as
well as the starting level of potassium were both only estimates. (R. 346:88 )
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The State's other evidence consisted of the testimony of a girlfriend Billy had after
Jamie's death, Shareen Martinez. (R. 347:51.) Ms. Martinez testified about statements
Billy made about Jamie—e.g., "he accidentally hurt her"—but Ms. Martinez made clear
that Billy never told her that he killed Jamie and that he believed her death was the result
of a robbery related to Billy's drug dealing activities. (R. 348:30, 38, 49.) Ms. Martinez
also explained that when Billy said he accidentally hurt Jamie, he was referring to an
altercation in which Jamie jumped on his car, fell off, and hurt herself. (R. 348:40-41.)
A police officer testified that Billy had "scrapes and scratches" on his neck.
(R. 348:71.) Billy explained (and his brother and father confirmed) that those were the
result of the altercation with law enforcement when he tried to rush into the trailer after
being informed of Jamie's death. (R. 348:71-72, 221-22, 228.) There was no evidence
that co-workers had seen any injuries on Billy while at work, and police confirmed that
he spent the entire day at work. (R. 348:139.)
According to the police, there was no evidence of a robbery—a purse, an
unidentified amount of cash, and a Rolex were in the trailer. (R. 348:55, 57.) However,
the police found a safe in the bedroom closet, where Billy kept drugs and money, open
and empty. (R. 348:104, 148.) .
Finally, the jury heard from the State's mechanic expert, Wayne Smith. In August
1996, he tested the 1972 Ford truck to analyze the mechanical issues identified by Billy.
(R. 348:140, 170, 172.) Mr. Smith did not drive the vehicle and did not test it on a slope
similar to the slope of the trailer's driveway. (R. 348:142, 179.) He testified that the
gears of Billy's truck could be shifted without assistance from inside the truck.
(R. 348:172-74.) In contrast to this testimony, Mr. Smith's witness affidavit in 1996—
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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the only paperwork from the day of the inspection—said no such thing, and the full report
from his inspection of the vehicle in 1996 was lost during the 11-year delay in bringing
charges. (R. 348:180-81.) The affidavit from the day of the inspection said only that the
gears could be shifted from underneath the vehicle or under the hood, something
consistent with Billy's account. (R. 348:183-84.) Although Mr. Smith testified that he
was sure that he could shift the gears of the truck from inside the vehicle, he could not
remember any memorable details about the truck from a decade earlier, most notably the
fact that the truck had no steering wheel at the time of the investigation. (R. 348:141-42,
172.)
C.

The Jailhouse Informant

The State had one additional witness—a sophisticated criminal and professional
jailhouse informant with knowledge of how to manipulate the criminal justice system.
Troy Miller was fortunate enough to have 4 different prisoners—including Billy—
confess murders to him weeks before his sentencing. (R. 347:94-95.) The alleged
confession included Billy stating that Jamie did not have any water in her lungs and
"That's what is going to get me;" and Billy stating "It wasn't supposed to happen like
that" and "She was gone when we put her there." (R. 347:100, 102-03.)
However, Troy Miller's testimony lacks credibility. Mr. Miller has a lengthy
criminal history including at least 7 felonies, many involving dishonesty. In 1991, at the
age of 18, Mr. Miller was convicted of theft by deception. (R. 347:115.) That same year,
he was convicted of making a false report to the police. (R. 347:115.) In 1992,
Mr. Miller was convicted of three felony counts of possessing and transferring stolen
vehicles. (R. 347:116.) In 1993, Mr. Miller gave false information to a police officer.
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(R. 347:117.) In 1997, he was convicted of possessing a dangerous weapon while on
parole. (R. 347:118.) In 2001, he was convicted of temporary deprivation of a motor
vehicle and again gave false information to a peace officer. (R. 347:119.) Finally, when
Billy allegedly confessed to Mr. Miller, he was serving time for a 2008 burglary charge
to which he had pled guilty and was awaiting sentencing. (R. 347:120.)
It was during this period (January and February 2009) between Mr. Miller's guilty
plea on January 5, 2009, and his scheduled sentencing hearing on March 2, 2009, when
Mr. Miller told police that Billy had confessed. (R. 369-70; 347:98-99, 103, 108.) Also
during this two-month period, Mr. Miller told police that 3 other prisoners had confessed
to him in murder cases. (R. 347:108, 122-23, 132.) Curiously, Mr. Miller was in jail for
14 months without anyone confessing to him, and then just prior to his sentencing, he
was the confidant of 4 separate murderers. (R. 347:95, 121, 132.)
Mr. Miller was informing to police about all 4 of these murder cases.
(R. 347:111.) But according to the State, Mr. Miller was offered no favorable treatment
in exchange. (R. 347:111; 346:9-14.) The prosecutor in this case claims to have been
unaware that Mr. Miller was working as an informant in other homicide cases.
(R. 346:11.) And Mr. Miller, who was supposed to be sentenced a few weeks before the
trial, had his sentencing continued until after he had testified in this case, even though,
according to the prosecutor, Mr. Miller would receive no benefit from having testified.
(R. 347:123.) As it turned out, days after Billy's trial Mr. Miller was sentenced to only
32 days in jail, despite a recommendation from Adult Probation and Parole that
Mr. Miller be returned to Utah State Prison for an indeterminate sentence. (R. 323.)
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In Mr. Miller's phone call with police (which Mr. Miller testified was made on his
behalf by a friend), the caller, identified as Mr. Miller, stated "I have a—urn (inaudible)
to a murder case and I want to work with you guys to get some issues resolved on the
case that I have." (R. 347:127-28.) In a second call to law enforcement, the caller, again
identified as Mr. Miller, stated "I have a confession to a murder in an ongoing case. It's
going on right now and the person that confessed to me is right here in jail too. I need to
talk to detectives as soon as I can. I want to try to work out—I've got a little zero to five
cgtse. I should get credit for time served but I want to do the right thing. And I want to
get a little bit of help with my case." (R. 347:129.) Despite the motivation identified in
these calls, the State and Mr. Miller denied that his delayed sentencing would be affected
by his testimony in this case. Later, of course, his sentence was less severe than the
recommended sentence, with the prosecutor's express agreement. (R. 323; 370.)
D.

The Defense Witnesses

The defense presented evidence that pointed to alternative theories of the crime
ignored by police for 11 years. First, several neighbors testified about unusual activity in
the neighborhood the day of Jamie's death and in the weeks before Jamie's death. Two
neighbors saw suspicious men in the early morning hours of August 7 walking toward
Jamie's trailer. (R. 348:187, 192-93, 197, 199-200.) And a third neighbor saw a strange
man wearing a disguise looking in the windows of the trailer a few weeks prior to the
murder. (R. 349:93-95.) These neighbors, along with a fourth neighbor, reported that
activity to the police after Jamie's death, but the police never followed up with them.
(R. 348:192-93; 349:98-99.)
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The defense also had an expert medical witness who agreed with the State medical
examiner that the time of death could have been after Billy left for work at 6 a.m.
(R. 349:41-42, 47, 53.) He also agreed that the temperature of the water could affect time
of death calculations and that the medical examiner's calculations were based on being in
environmental air. (R. 349:45, 47.) He agreed with the 12-hour—8 p.m. to 8 a.m.—
range identified by the State's medical examiner, but believed that given the variables
and unknowns, the time of death could be expanded out even to 9 a.m. (R. 349:53-54.)
The jury heard evidence that 3 different hairs were found in Jamie's left hand.
(R. 348:129-30; 349:12.) However, despite the State's forensic testing of much of the
evidence at the scene of the crime, the State never conducted DNA testing on the hairs.
(R. 349:76, 82.) Importantly, the State did conduct a non-DNA microscopic comparison
test on the hairs in 1996, which demonstrated that one of the three hairs was consistent
with Jamie's hair and that none of the hairs found in Jamie's hand were consistent with
Billy's hair. (R. 349:7-13, R. 349:81.) Thus, even though there were two unidentified
hairs in Jamie's hand, and it was possible to conduct DNA testing on the hair evidence,
the State failed to test this hair, presumably because it did not conform to their only
theory of the crime—that Billy murdered Jamie. (R. 349:82, 87.) In fact, the State tried
to exclude any evidence related to the hairs and characterized the report that the hairs
were not Billy's or Jamie's as "misleading," even though the State conceded that the
hairs did not belong to Billy. (R. 348:21-22.)
The failure to test evidence that may have pointed to other suspects is particularly
troubling in light of the fact that police did conduct DNA testing of bodily fluids and
fingernails in 2002 and 2007. (R. 349:76; 348:163.) In 2007, the State's investigation of
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the fingernail evidence rendered DNA, but no Y-chromosome DNA (meaning, it did not
come from a male) so the lab did not investigate further. (R. 349:77.) The State pursued
only evidence that Billy killed Jamie, did not follow up on any other leads, and failed to
file charges for more than 11 years, when defense counsel's ability to develop alternative
theories had been compromised.
The police also conducted DNA testing of a confession letter received by the
police in which an unidentified male confessed to killing Jamie. (R. 348:135-36.) The
letter was signed with a Hispanic surname. (R. 348:135.) The DNA testing
demonstrated that the unidentified male DNA on the envelope and stamp did not belong
to Billy. (R. 348:137-38, 349:79.) The lab suggested that the profile be run through the
national database, but it never was, apparently because Billy had already been excluded.
(R. 349:80.) Testing of this letter also confirmed that the handwriting was not that of
Billy. (R. 348:137.) Again, when the evidence did not point to Billy Charles, the police
stopped investigating.
Finally, the defense presented evidence corroborating Billy's story about his truck.
Billy's brother testified that he had had to assist Billy with his truck the weekend before.
(R. 348:206-07.) Billy could not get the truck into gear while at the grocery store, so his
brother held his foot on the brake while Billy went under the truck to shift the linkage.
(R. 348:207.) According to the witness, it took two people to get the truck going, just as
Billy consistently had explained to law enforcement. (R. 348:208.) An investigator also
testified about the slope of the trailer's driveway, confirming Billy's story that he could
not roll the truck out on his own without changing into reverse gear. (R. 348:250, 256.)
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But the jury did not hear the testimony of Jamie's grandmother who died in 2002.
The grandmother's testimony would have corroborated Billy's story because she heard
Billy and Jamie discussing how Jamie would help Billy start the truck the morning of
August 7. (R. 349:149-50.)
In closing arguments, the State accused Billy of fabricating his story about the
truck's mechanical problems: "Then we have his story about his truck, a story that's full
of contradictions and is not credible. And he's making up that story." (R. 349:133-137.)
According to the State, there was no evidence to corroborate Billy's story that his truck
was not working properly and that he could not start the truck without assistance.
Importantly, two critical pieces of evidence that did corroborate Billy's story were not
available at trial due to the 11-year delay—Jamie's grandmother's testimony and the
1996 report on the vehicle.
E.

Evidence the Jury Did Not Hear Due to Counsel's Mistakes

In addition to the evidence the jury never heard due to the 11-year delay, other
critical evidence was not presented due to the errors of trial counsel. First, although the
jury should have heard the grandmother's testimony, there were two statements in a
police report that trial counsel sought to present. The court, however, excluded the
evidence because trial counsel failed to provide notice. (R. 348:155.)
Second, even though the prosecutor focused on whether Billy needed Jamie's help
to drive the truck, trial counsel failed to call an identified expert to corroborate Billy's
story about the truck's mechanical problems. (R. 103.)
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Third, trial counsel failed to elicit the testimony of the neighbor, Mr. Heidt,
presented during the preliminary hearing. That testimony also would have corroborated
Billy's story about the mechanical issues with the truck. (R. 32:25-27.)
Finally, trial counsel failed to subpoena Jamie's cousin, Brian Meik, to testify that
(i) he spoke by telephone to Jamie at 3 a.m. on August 7; (ii) a brown car was in the
trailer's driveway at 8 a.m. on August 7, and (iii) he received a threatening phone call the
day of Jamie's funeral where the caller stated "you didn't see a brown car."
(R. 349:117.)
Summary of the Argument
This court should vacate Billy Charles' conviction. The police violated his due
process rights by intentionally failing to investigate alternative theories of the crime, and
the prosecutor violated his due process rights by failing to file charges for more than 11
years, even though the eventual charges were based upon evidence known in 1996. The
delay served only to compromise Billy's ability to defend himself, as vital evidence was
lost, a critical witness died, and the ability to develop leads not followed by police
diminished. Because there is no good faith explanation of the delay or tunnel-vision
investigation, this court should vacate the conviction and sentence.
In the alternative, this court should order a new trial based on trial counsel's
ineffective assistance. The critical issue in this case was whether Jamie was alive when
Billy left for work at 6 a.m. According to Billy, she was alive and she assisted him with
backing his vehicle out of the driveway—a task he could not complete alone. Trial
counsel failed to present evidence corroborating Billy's story—including Jamie's
grandmother's statement that Jamie would need to assist Billy that morning, an expert
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mechanic's testimony about the work done on the truck after Jamie's death, and a
neighbor's testimony that he previously had helped Billy back his truck out of the drive.
Without this evidence, the State was able to argue that Billy's story was fabricated. The
failure to present this evidence constituted constitutionally ineffective assistance.
Trial counsel was also constitutionally ineffective when he failed to present
exculpatory testimony from a witness who spoke to Jamie in the early hours of August 7,
1996, saw a brown car in the driveway of the trailer after Billy left for work, and was
later threatened about disclosing this knowledge. Trial counsel's failure to call this
witness was objectively deficient and prejudicial.
Finally, the trial court committed reversible error when it did not properly instruct
the jury regarding how to assess jailhouse informant testimony, something ripe with
insidious reliability problems. Troy Miller's testimony is a perfect example of these
problems. Mr. Miller had a lengthy criminal history, knew how to manipulate the
criminal justice system, received a reduced sentence after testifying against Billy, and
was acting as an informant for the State in 4 separate murder cases. The jury was not
instructed that it could consider all of these facts in assessing Mr. Miller's testimony, and
Mr. Miller's testimony about Billy's "confession" was critical to the State's weak
circumstantial case. Had the jury been instructed to consider all of this information in
assessing Mr. Miller's credibility, it likely would have disregarded his testimony and
reached a different verdict. This court should order a new trial.
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Argument
I.

The State Violated the Defendant's Due Process Rights by Delaying Its Filing
of Charges For 11 Years While Not Investigating Other Leads
The State's 11-year delay in bringing charges resulted in the loss of critical

evidence that would have aided Billy Charles at trial.2 Federal due process guarantees
"access to evidence," which includes the "loss of evidence . . . caused by the state's delay
in filing formal charges against the defendant." State v. Hales, 2007 UT 14, ^ 40, 152
P.3d 321. A state violates a defendant's due process rights where its delay in bringing
charges was in bad faith and caused prejudice. Id. 1f 49. Here, 11 years passed before the
State brought charges against Billy Charles. And after those 11 years, the State had no
more evidence than it did shortly after Jamie's death in 1996. In this case, the delay was
both prejudicial and in bad faith.
The delay resulted in the "loss, destruction, and erosion of evidence," as witnesses
died, evidence was lost, and leads not followed by police became nearly impossible to
follow by defense investigators, demonstrating prejudice well beyond that described as
stemming from the mere 2-year delay in Hales. 2007 UT 14,fflf26-27. First, the delay
here resulted in the loss of a key report on the investigation of Billy's vehicle, which
likely would have corroborated Billy's story that he required assistance to use the truck
Trial counsel repeatedly argued that the State's delay significantly prejudiced the
defense. (R. 349:146, 148, 150, 163, 166; 401:40.) To the extent the court determines
the due process issue was not preserved, it was ineffective assistance and objectively
deficient for trial counsel to fail to mention the words "due process" when discussing the
prejudicial delay and tunnel-vision investigation. The argument that the delay may have
amounted to a due process violation was pointed out to defense counsel by the court, and
defense counsel responded that he would deal expressly with the due process issue later,
which he never did. (R. 401:40.) If it was not preserved, this objectively deficient
performance by counsel was prejudicial because a due process violation requires that
charges be dismissed.
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on the morning Jamie was killed. Billy has consistently maintained that Jamie helped
him pull his truck out of the driveway that morning, as he had to change the gears of the
truck from underneath while Jamie was in the cab. In the absence of that report, the
State's mechanic was allowed to testify from his 11-year-old memory that the gears could
be shifted from inside the vehicle, even though (i) the mechanic's August 1996
affidavit—drafted around the same time as the lost report—stated that the truck's gears
could be shifted from underneath the vehicle or under the hood, not inside the cab, and
(ii) the mechanic lacked any memory of other memorable facts about Billy's vehicle,
such as the fact that it lacked a steering wheel that had been removed previously pursuant
to a search warrant.
Given the content of the August 1996 affidavit, it is likely that the full report from
1996 would have corroborated Billy's story that he could not shift the truck's gears from
inside the cab and that he required Jamie's assistance before he could drive the truck to
work that morning. It is more than "mere speculation" that the content of the full report
from 1996 would have supported Billy's story and aided the defense. Id *f 51. This
evidence would have prevented the State from repeatedly attacking the credibility of
Billy's story about the morning of Jamie's death and arguing at closing that Billy's "story
about his truck, a story that's full of contradictions and is not credible. And he's making
up that story." (R. 349:133-137.) The crucial report was lost during the 11-year delay
and could not be obtained from another source. Id.

3

The mechanic's affidavit from the day he tested the vehicle stated: "I found that I could
shift the gears from either under the hood or by going under the vehicle and moving the
linkage." (State's Exhibit 29, "Affidavit," Addendum D; R. 378:177.)
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Second, during the delay the victim's grandmother died. This key witness would
have corroborated that Billy required Jamie's assistance to shift the truck's gears that
morning.4 Jamie's grandmother would have been a very credible defense witness who
would have testified had the State brought the charges in a timely manner.5 And the
court need not speculate as to whether her testimony would have been favorable, as it
appears in a police report and was proffered, but not introduced, at trial. (R. 348:150
("she recalls Billy telling Jamie that she is going to have to get up early and help him
push the truck back").)
Third, there likely would have been additional defense witnesses and favorable
evidence had the State continued to investigate. And if charges had been timely brought,
the defense could have investigated and developed alternative theories without over a
decade of time eroding leads. The delay itself had specific prejudicial effects, as opposed
to the "nonspecific negative effects of delay" discussed in Hales, id % 51, including the
elimination of identifiable evidence and testimony supporting Billy's assertion that Jamie
was alive when he left for work on August 7—the critical contested issue in this murder
case.

4

While Billy's brother corroborated the fact that Billy needed assistance to change the
gears of the vehicle, the jury apparently discounted this testimony because of the bias
Billy's brother may have had. Jamie's grandmother and the inspector's report would not
have suffered the problem of bias in favor of the defense.
5

While two statements of Jamie's grandmother that support Billy's story are included in
a police report, this evidence was not presented at trial. And if those statements had been
presented, they are not equivalent to live testimony of the victim's grandmother. See
infra Part 11(A)(1); Hales, 2007 UT 14, ^ 51 (requiring defendant to establish that he
could not have obtained the evidence from another source). In fact, Jamie's grandmother
was one of the last people to see Jamie alive—she saw Jamie and Billy together the night
before Jamie's death and heard the couple discussing how Jamie would help Billy the
following morning.
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Under the due process test, the State's delay also must have been in bad faith.
Here, the delay served no "investigative purpose." Id. If 48. Although the State
considered this case a "cold case'* after 1996, it nonetheless filed charges against Billy in
2007 with no new evidence. All evidence was known to police shortly after Jamie's
death in 1996. (R. 1-4.) The only thing that changed between 19976 and 2007 is that
defense leads went cold and the ability of Billy to defend himself diminished. There is
no good faith explanation for the delay.
Because the State's 11-year delay in bringing charges both was in bad faith and
prejudiced Billy's defense, it violated Billy's right to due process. Hales, 2007 UT 14,
<[ 2. Billy's conviction and sentence should be vacated. And to the extent the State
argues that it did investigate the case during the 11 year delay, that "investigation" did
not follow any lead implicating someone other than Billy. The investigation itself
violated Billy's due process rights. See, e.g., Wilson v. Lawrence County, 260 F.3d 946,
955 (8th Cir. 2001) (recognizing that "reckless or intentional failure to investigate other
leads offends a defendant's due process rights").
For instance, the State sent samples it had in 1996 out for DNA testing in 2002
and 2007. The results of the testing did not support the State's view that Billy killed
Jamie. Instead of having the samples tested further to find out whether someone else
committed the crime, the State ignored new evidence that, for example, the fingernail
clippings had non-Y chromosome DNA on them. The State also ignored the crime lab's
6

In 1997, the State placed a recording device on Jamie's gravesite in the hopes of
hearing a confession. That effort failed.
7
And we know that no additional evidence was ever discovered that implicated Billy
because the charges in 2007 were based only on evidence that the State had in 1996.
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suggestion that the DNA from a stamp on a confession letter—which had male DNA that
was not a match for Billy—be run through the national database to identify who sent that
letter.8 Because the State intentionally, or at least recklessly, failed to investigate anyone
other than Billy, the investigation also violated Billy's due process rights. Wilson, 260
F.3d at 957 (8th Cir. 2001) ("Law enforcement officers, like prosecutors, have a
responsibility to criminal defendants to conduct their investigations and prosecutions
fairly . . . . Although charged with investigating and prosecuting the accused with
earnestness and vigor, officers must be faithful to the overriding interest that justice shall
be done.") (citations and quotations omitted).
Regardless of whether this court focuses on the 11-year delay or intentionally
myopic investigation, Billy's conviction should be vacated because his due process rights
were violated.
II.

Trial Counsel's Assistance Was Ineffective
Trial counsel was ineffective in this case on a number of occasions. First, he was

ineffective in failing to present sufficient evidence to corroborate Billy's story that Jamie
was alive when he left the trailer at 6 a.m. because he could not have driven his truck
without her assistance. Second, trial counsel was ineffective in failing to call Jamie's
cousin, Brian Meik, as a witness and instead relying on the State to bring him to trial—
which the State then failed to do—when Mr. Meik had evidence that someone was at the
trailer the morning of August 7 after Billy left for work.

Although the results of one DNA test, unsurprisingly, found Billy's sperm, the State did
not use this evidence, presumably because it proved nothing. (R. 349:79-80.)
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The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides a "right to the
effective assistance of counsel." State v. Hales, 2007 UT 14, If 68, 152 P.3d 321. A
defendant is entitled to a new trial due to ineffective assistance of counsel where
(i) "counsel's performance was so deficient as to fall below an objective standard of
reasonableness" and (ii) "but for counsel's deficient performance there is a reasonable
probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different." Id. To establish
deficient performance, the challenged action must not constitute "sound trial strategy."
Id. f 70. In this case, trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective.
A.

Evidence Corroborating Billy's Assertion that Jamie Was Alive When
He Left for Work

Billy consistently told police that Jamie was alive when he left for work because
she helped him back his truck out of the trailer's driveway that morning. According to
Billy, he could not shift the truck's gears from inside the cab. He had to shift the gears
under the truck while someone else—Jamie—held the brake. That morning, he shifted
the gear to reverse while Jamie sat in the cab and held the brake. Then he pulled the
truck out in reverse gear. Jamie then held the brake again while Billy shifted the truck
into drive.
The State argued that this story was not credible and that there was nothing to
support it. At trial, Billy's brother testified that he had helped Billy go through these
maneuvers at the grocery store the weekend before Jamie's death. The State's mechanic
expert, however, testified that the gears could be shifted from inside the cab (despite no
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record evidence that his investigation had any such result).9 Trial counsel attempted to
introduce a statement by Jamie's grandmother corroborating Billy's story, but the court
excluded the evidence. Trial counsel also failed to introduce other evidence that would
have corroborated Billy's story, including testimony from a mechanic and testimony of a
neighbor that he had previously helped Billy back his truck out of the driveway.
1.

Trial counsel was deficient in failing to ensure that Jamie's
grandmother's statement was admitted into evidence

Trial counsel's performance was deficient because he failed to introduce Jamie's
grandmother's statement corroborating the fact that Jamie's assistance was required for
Billy to drive the truck on August 7. During an interview with police shortly after
Jamie's death, Jamie's grandmother told the detective that on the night of August 6,
1996, while the family was at her home, she recalled Billy telling Jamie that she needed
to get up early and help him push his truck back.10 (R. 348:150; 342:148.) The next
morning, on August 7, Jamie was killed. Jamie's grandmother passed awav during the
State's 11-year delay in bringing charges against Billy.
At trial, because Jamie's grandmother was unavailable to testify, trial counsel had
every intention of introducing her statement as evidence through the police detective who
took her statement. During opening statement, trial counsel told the jury that he would

9

The mechanic's affidavit from the day he tested the vehicle stated: "I found that I
could shift the gears from either under the hood or by going under the vehicle and
moving the linkage." (State's Exhibit 29, "Affidavit," Addendum D; R. 378:177.)
Trial counsel told the court there were "two specific statements" that he intended to
introduce, but the record only explains one particular statement: that Billy told Jamie she
would need to get up early and help him push the truck back.
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introduce this testimony from Jamie's grandmother.

Then, on the third day of trial,

counsel told the court that he was going to introduce this statement through Detective
Ownby. (R. 348:150.) The prosecutor objected. (R. 348:151.) The court stated that the
defense had not given proper notice under Utah Rule of Evidence 807 to use the evidence
and therefore excluded it. (R. 348:152 ("If you didn't give prior notice in advance of trial
that you intended to invoke the catch-all, then I'm going to deny.").)
There is no conceivable strategic reason for trial counsel's failure to provide
adequate notice and ensure that the jury would hear this important evidence. And the
evidence would have been admitted absent this deficient performance by trial counsel.
(R. 348:150.) Therefore, trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective.
2.

Trial counsel was deficient in failing to present other evidence
about the truck's mechanical problems

There was other evidence to corroborate Billy's need for assistance with his truck
on August 7 that counsel also failed to present. First, less than a month before trial, trial
counsel identified an expert witness who was a mechanic. (R. 103.) According to trial
counsel, the mechanic would testify about work done on the truck after it was released
from police custody in 1996. (R. 103.) This evidence would have corroborated the
mechanical issues with the truck that required Jamie's assistance for Billy to leave for
work that morning. The State's assertion that Billy could start his truck by himself and
did not require Jamie's help was crucial to the State's case against Billy. Trial counsel's
failure to present the testimony of this witness who would have corroborated Billy's
11

Trial counsel told the jury that it would hear evidence that the grandmother
"remembered Billy telling [Jamie] that she would have to get up early and help him get
the truck going." (R. 342:148.)
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testimony was ineffective assistance. State v. Hales, 2007 UT 14, <f 3, 152 P.3d 321
(ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to have CT scans that were "crucial" to the
State's case examined by a qualified expert).
Unlike cases where this court concludes that failure to call an expert did not
constitute ineffective assistance, here, as in Hales, the "defense's theory required the jury
to disbelieve" the State's expert mechanic and the State's characterization that Jamie's
assistance was not required for Billy to drive to work on August 7—and accordingly,
make the ultimate conclusion in this case about whether or not Jamie was alive after Billy
left for work.

Hales, 2007 UT 14, ^f 80. Under these circumstances, it was objectively

deficient for trial counsel to fail to bring his witness to trial. There is no strategic reason
for failing to introduce this testimony, especially where counsel identified him as a
witness before trial.
Second, Billy's neighbor Stephen Heidt, testified at the preliminary hearing and at
trial. During trial, trial counsel asked Mr. Heidt if he had ever helped Billy work on his
truck. Mr. Heidt responded that "I do believe I had helped him once or twice with his
truck." (R. 347:26.) Trial counsel did not follow up. He should have, as it would have
highlighted the problems with the truck—the crucial issue in the case. During the
preliminary hearing, the following exchange took place:
Q:

Mr. Heidt, let's—I didn't hear all your answer about the other times
that you helped Billy with his truck before, when did you say that
occurred?

Of course, the defendant's ability to call such an expert was hampered by the 11-year
delay, which prevented a new expert from examining the vehicle and providing
testimony. Fortunately, trial counsel identified the mechanic who fixed the problems
with the truck after it was released from police custody in 1996. But he failed to bring
that witness to trial.
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A:

It would have been sometime previous to August 6th or 7th. One time
he asked me if I could help him one morning push his truck out of
the driveway.

Q:

And that was just on one prior occasion.

A:

At one prior occasion.

Q:

You say he asked you to help him push his truck out of the
driveway?

A:

Yes.

Q:

Was the nose in toward the house at that time?

A:

I believe so.

Q:

And did he explain to you what the purpose was of having you help
him push it?

A:

I had an understanding of it. I'm sure he did explain to me. I don't
remember what it was at this time.

Q:

You didn't jump start it on that occasion?

A:

I do not remember. I think we pushed him back—we were on top of
a hill. He would have just needed to get started to get—pop the
clutch and get started but I don't remember."

(R. 32:25-27.) This testimony is consistent with Billy's claim that, when the truck was
parked with the nose toward the house (as it undisputedly was on August 7), he could not
pull the car out without assistance. It undermines the State's theory that Billy fabricated
the problems with his truck and supports Billy's claim that he required Jamie's help that
morning, and Jamie in fact helped him. Trial counsel's failure to elicit this testimony that
was apparent from the preliminary hearing testimony (which counsel in fact referenced
and quoted from for other aspects of Mr. Heidt's testimony at trial) was objectively
deficient. (R. 347:45-46.) There was no strategic reason for counsel's failure to
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introduce this beneficial testimony while questioning Mr. Heidt. This issue alone was
critical to the jury determining whether Jamie was alive when Billy left for work and,
accordingly, whether Billy killed Jamie. Trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective in
failing to present this evidence.
3.

The Failure of Defense Counsel to Present this Evidence Was
Prejudicial

Counsel's deficient performance is prejudicial when "there is a reasonable
probability that, absent the errors, the fact-finder would have had a reasonable doubt
respecting guilt." Hales, 2007 UT 14, ^ 86. "A reasonable probability is a probability
sufficient to undermine confidence in the jury verdict." Id. "Because some errors will
have had a pervasive effect on the inferences to be drawn from the evidence, altering the
entire evidentiary picture, and some will have had an isolated trivial effect," the court
considers "the totality of the evidence before the jury." IdL
In this case, trial counsel's deficient performance in failing to admit three separate
pieces of evidence that would have corroborated Billy's statement that Jamie was alive
when he left for work at 6 a.m. was prejudicial. There is a reasonable probability of a
different verdict, as each of these failures alters the entire evidentiary picture before the
jury.
Without this evidence, the jury heard Billy's statement that Jamie was alive and
she assisted him with pulling the car out the morning of her death. His brother, a witness
the jury could consider biased, corroborated the problems with the truck. The neighbor
corroborated that the truck was backed out that morning. But there was no other
evidence to support Billy's story. And the prosecutor told the jury that Billy's story was
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"fabricated" during closing arguments: "Then we have his story about his truck, a story
that's full of contradictions and is not credible. And he's making up that story."
(R. 349:133-137.) If any of these three pieces of evidence had been admitted, the entire
evidentiary picture of the case would have been altered. Billy's story would have been
corroborated by unbiased witnesses, and the State could not have attacked it as it did
during closing.
Without this important corroborating testimony, the only evidence that
contradicted Billy's story was the State's expert mechanic, who testified—contrary to his
affidavit—that he could shift the gears of the truck from inside the cab. This would not
have been enough to extinguish reasonable doubt. And all evidence against Billy was
circumstantial. There was no physical evidence to link Billy to the crime. Based on both
medical experts, the time of death could have been after Billy left, and based on the
State's medical examiner, Jamie was not placed in the bathtub until after Billy
undisputedly left for work. The neighbor testified that he did not see Jamie, but she
"absolutely" could have been there. Billy's neck was scratched, but there was no
evidence that the scratches were present when he was at work prior to the police
altercation. Billy's ex-girlfriend testified that he said he accidentally hurt Jamie, but
explained that he did not say he killed her and that the statement was in reference to a
specific incident between Billy and Jamie—not her death. The only other evidence was
the "confession" to a sophisticated career criminal and jailhouse snitch who provided the
police with confessions in four separate murder cases in a two month period.
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There was evidence of suspicious activity around the trailer in the weeks before
and day of Jamie's murder. There was evidence of two unidentified hairs in Jamie's
hand. And there was a confession letter with unidentified male DNA on the stamp.
Based on the totality of the evidence, if the jury had heard evidence corroborating Billy's
consistent statement that Jamie was alive when he left that morning and had to have been
alive to assist him with his truck, there is a reasonable probability that the verdict would
have been different. "Because the State's murder case . . . hinged on the interpretation"
of the evidence that Billy could operate the vehicle without assistance, evidence which
demonstrated the opposite would have altered the verdict in this case. Id f 92. The error
had a pervasive effect on the entire evidentiary picture. The error was prejudicial and a
new trial is warranted.
B.

Trial counsel was ineffective in failing to secure the testimony of Brian
Meik

Trial counsel was ineffective also for failing to call a witness who spoke to Jamie
at 3 a.m. on August 7, had evidence that a third party was at the trailer at 8 a.m. on
August 7, and received a threatening phone call about this information. If called to
testify, Brian Meik would have told the jury, as he had previously told police on two
occasions, that "he received a phone call from the victim the morning that she died at
about one to 3 a.m. on the 7th." (R. 349:117.) Mr. Meik also remembered seeing a
brown car parked in the driveway of Billy and Jamie's trailer the morning of the killing.
(R. 349:117.) Finally, on the day of Jamie's funeral, he received a phone call from an
unknown individual who said "you did not see a brown car" in a threatening manner.
(R. 349:117.) Importantly, this witness places a third party at the crime scene the
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morning of the murder and was threatened about his knowledge of this information. In
addition, he was one of the last people to speak to Jamie and that testimony impacts the
medical examiner's testimony about time of death. Mr. Meik's testimony was important
and trial counsel had every intention of calling him as a witness. Yet, just as with the
testimony of Jamie's grandmother, trial counsel simply failed to take the steps necessary
to secure Mr. Meik as a witness.
Mr. Meik, as a family member to Jamie, may have had reason to avoid testifying
in this case, where he had evidence implicating a third party as the perpetrator—not Billy.
Still, the State identified Mr. Meik as a potential witness on its original witness list.
(R. 349:118.) Instead of also identifying Mr. Meik, trial counsel relied on the State to
bring him to trial and was satisfied that he could cross-examine Mr. Meik. Trial counsel
did nothing to secure Mr. Meik's presence despite trial counsel's clear intention to
present his testimony as evidence to the jury. (R. 349:118.)
Trial counsel's performance was deficient. First, trial counsel should have listed
Mr. Meik as his witness and subpoenaed him prior to trial. However, even absent that
failure, trial counsel should have been alerted to his need to secure the witness on the first
day of trial when the State did not list Mr. Meik as a witness during voir
dire. (R. 342:33.) Instead, trial counsel did nothing.
It was not until after the State rested its case without calling Mr. Meik that trial
counsel realized it would be up to him to secure Mr. Meik's testimony, but his last ditch
effort the night before the last day of trial was fruitless. (R.349:l 16-18; 348:240.) Trial
counsel's only excuse to the court for not securing the witness was "He was on their
witness list and that's why I didn't do it." (R. 348:240.)
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Not surprisingly, trial counsel could not locate Mr. Meik the night before he
wanted him to testify. Trial counsel's failure to call Mr. Meik, who had potentially
exculpatory evidence or, at the least, evidence which could have generated reasonable
doubt because there was a third party at the trailer that morning, was ineffective
assistance. This information became more critical when Mr. Meik received threatening
phone calls about the information.
This case is akin to Baylor v. Estelle, where the Ninth Circuit recognized that
defense counsel's performance was deficient in failing to call a witness with potentially
exculpatory evidence. 94 F.3d 1321 (9th Cir. 1996). In Baylor, defense counsel relied on
the state to call an expert witness to testify about DNA results that showed that it was
unlikely that the defendant was the donor. Id. at 1323. During trial, defense counsel
attempted unsuccessfully to subpoena the witness after learning that the state would not
call him. Id. Defense counsel then tried unsuccessfully to get the witness's written
report admitted without the witness's testimony. Id, The Ninth Circuit determined that
trial counsel's failure to secure the witness was deficient, even when he attempted to
secure the testimony after it was too late. It was also prejudicial because the testimony
would have tended to show that the defendant was not the perpetrator. Id at 1324. The
scenario is almost identical to this case, where trial counsel failed to secure a witness with
potentially exculpatory evidence.
Trial counsel's failure was not strategic, as he had every intention of putting on
this evidence through Mr. Meik as a live witness, but simply failed to secure the
witness's presence and relied on the State. And his last ditch effort to present the
statements through another witness as hearsay was useless because he could not identify
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any hearsay exception and the court noted that "on a whole number of levels, the catchall
doesn't apply." (R. 349:119-20.)
Just as in Baylor, the failure of defense counsel to present this potentially
exculpatory evidence was prejudicial. Similar to the evidence corroborating the
mechanical problems with Billy's truck, the fact that a third party was at the trailer the
morning of Jamie's death after Billy was undisputedly at work, would have had a
pervasive effect on the inferences the jury drew from the State's weak circumstantial
case. In addition, if Jamie were alive at 3 a.m., it may have influenced the jury's view of
the medical examiner's testimony because, while he admitted that the time of death could
range from 8 p.m. to 8 a.m., he also testified that his best guess was that she died between
2 and 4. (R. 346:62.) With the testimony of Mr. Meik, there is a reasonable probability
that the jury would have rendered a different verdict.
III.

The Court Erred in Failing to Give the Defendant's Requested Instruction on
the Jailhouse Informant
As best demonstrated by the prosecutor's closing arguments, the jailhouse

informant testimony was critical to the State's case.

Yet it is difficult to imagine a

jailhouse informant lacking in credibility more than Troy Miller. The jury, however, was
not instructed to consider many of the elements relevant to his credibility.
The prosecutor stated at closing, in regard to Mr. Miller: "He's never snitched. He has
never come forward before." He further stated that Mr. Miller is putting his life in danger
to come forward in this case—"He gets stabbed. You've seen even on T.V...." He
makes a big deal that Mr. Miller "plead to the felony months before he ever came
forward." And finally he states "If Troy Miller is making a false statement, he could
have come up with a lot better one than that. And he didn't." (R. 349:142-43, 188-89.)
The prosecutor went to great lengths to advocate for Troy Miller's credibility at closing
even though his testimony contradicted most of this: Mr. Miller was snitching in four
cases, there was no evidence that he was in danger of being stabbed, and although he had
pled guilty, Mr. Miller's sentencing was continued until after trial.
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Troy Miller has spent half his life in the criminal justice system. (R. 347:114.) He
knew how the criminal justice system worked and used that knowledge to his benefit by
becoming an informant in no fewer than 4 murder cases in the two months prior to his
sentencing. Because, the State offered no formal "deal" to Mr. Miller—who told police
he was motivated to inform on the four murders in order to "resolve" issues with his case
and receive "help" on his case—the State and Mr. Miller could openly assert to the court
and the jury that Mr. Miller was receiving no benefit for his testimony. (R. 347:127-29.)
But in the end, Mr. Miller's testimony for the State in this trial resulted in a reduced
sentence of 32 days in jail and not the harsher sentence recommended by Adult
Probation & Parole (and previously the prosecution) that Mr. Miller serve an
indeterminate sentence in the Utah State Prison. Billy is the unfortunate victim of
Mr. Miller's sophisticated manipulation of the criminal justice system.
To combat the incredible testimony of Mr. Miller, the defense requested the
following instruction to address the myriad of problems affecting the testimony of a jail
house informant:
You have heard testimony from a witness who may be
classified as a "jailhouse informer". The law allows the use
of such testimony. However; the testimony of an informer
who provides evidence against a defendant must be examined
and weighed by you with greater care than the testimony of
an ordinary witness. Whether the informer's testimony has
been affected by interest or prejudice against the defendant is
for you to determine. In making that determination, you
should consider:
(1)
whether the informer has received anything (including
leniency in prosecution, personal advantage, or vindication)
in exchange for testimony;
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(2)
other cases, and the number of other cases, in which
the informer testified or offered statements against another,
whether those statements are being used, and whether the
informer received any deal, promise, inducement, or benefit
in exchange for that testimony or statement; or believed he
was likely to receive some benefit from his cooperation;
(3) whether the informer has ever changed his or her
testimony;
(4)
the criminal history of the informant, not just limited
to number of convictions, but also the level of sophistication
gained through the informer's experience in the criminal
justice system; and
(5)

any other evidence related to the informer's credibility.

In sum, you should look at all of the evidence in deciding
what credence and what weight, if any, you would want to
give to the jailhouse informer.
You should bear in mind that a witness who has entered into
such an agreement with the government may have an interest
in the case different than any ordinary witness. A witness
who believes that he may be able to obtain his own freedom,
or receive a lighter sentence by giving testimony favorable to
the prosecution, has motive to testify falsely. Therefore, you
must examine his testimony with caution and weigh it with
great care. If, after scrutinizing his testimony, you decide to
accept it, you may give it whatever weight, if any, you find it
deserves.
(R. 227, 231-32.) This instruction is modeled after an Oklahoma instruction required
"[i]n all cases, where a court admits jailhouse informant testimony." Dodd v. State, 993
P.2d 778, 784 (Okla. Crim. App. 2000); Oklahoma Uniform Jury Instr.-Criminal 2d.
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Over trial counsel's objection, however, the court refused to give this

instruction. (R. 349:130.) Instead, the court instructed the jury as follows:
The testimony of an in-custody informant should be viewed
with caution and close scrutiny. In evaluating this testimony,
you should consider the extent to which it may have been
influenced by the receipt of, or expectation of, any benefits
from the party calling that witness. This does not mean that
you may arbitrarily disregard this testimony, but you should
give it the weight to which you find it to be entitled in the
light of all the evidence in this case.
(R. 280; 349:130.) The court erred in refusing to give the more comprehensive
instruction that includes a variety of elements relevant to the jury's determination of
Mr. Miller's credibility. Dodd v. State, 993 P.2d 778, 782 (Okla. Crim. App. 2000). The
given instruction advised the jury only to look at the influence of the "receipt of, or
expectation of, any benefits" in analyzing the credibility of Mr. Miller's testimony—and
the receipt of "any benefits" was denied by the State and the witness. Of course, the
benefit was received just after trial because Mr. Miller's sentencing was moved from just
before Billy's trial to just after Billy's trial.

The exact text of Oklahoma's instruction is as follows: "The testimony of an informer
who provides evidence against a defendant must be examined and weighed by you with
greater care than the testimony of an ordinary witness. Whether the informer's testimony
has been affected by interest or prejudice against the defendant is for you to determine. In
making that determination, you should consider: (1) whether the witness has received
anything (including pay, immunity from prosecution, leniency in prosecution, personal
advantage, or vindication) in exchange for testimony; (2) any other case in which the
informant testified or offered statements against an individual but was not called, and
whether the statements were admitted in the case, and whether the informant received any
deal, promise, inducement, or benefit in exchange for that testimony or statement; (3)
whether the informant has ever changed his or her testimony; (4) the criminal history of
the informant; and (5) any other evidence relevant to the informer's credibility." Dodd v.
State, 993 P.2d 778, 784 (Okla. Crim. App. 2000); Oklahoma Uniform Jury Instr.Criminal 2d. 9-43A.
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The given instruction ignored other aspects of Mr. Miller's situation that were
relevant to the jury's credibility analysis. For example, the requested instruction would
have advised the jury to consider uother cases, and the number of other cases, in which
the informer testified or offered statements against another." This was relevant and a
critical point for the jury to consider when it assessed Mr. Miller's credibility because
Mr. Miller had acted as an informant for the State in 4 cases. According to Mr. Miller in
January and February 2009, immediately after he pled guilty on January 5 and shortly
before he was to be sentenced on March 2, four different people confessed murders to
him. At no other time during his 14 months of incarceration did any other inmate make a
confession to him. The given instruction failed to instruct the jury to consider this
information that was highly probative of Mr. Miller's credibility.15
The requested instruction also would have instructed the jury to consider
Mr. Miller's "criminal history" and "the level of sophistication gained through the
informer's experience in the criminal justice system." Mr. Miller's lengthy 18-year
criminal history—as well as the deceitful nature of his crimes—directly impacted
Mr. Miller's credibility. The given instruction failed to instruct the jury to consider this
information.
Finally, the requested instruction is more reflective of the realities of today's
criminal justice system, where prosecutors do not give "deals" to jailhouse informants

15

The trial court failed to give the requested instruction despite the fact that it recognized
that "this individual is involved in at least providing information on four murder cases.
And it is - that's a highly, highly, highly unusual situation where one individual is now
alleging that four separate murderers all about the same time confessed to him and that
this happens immediately prior to his sentencing, which has been delayed. To call it
highly unusual would be a gross understatement." (R. 348:13-14).
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prior to their testimony and where the benefits that a jailhouse informant may receive—a
reduced sentence—may flow not only from the prosecution's agreement but from the
leniency of the sentencing judge looking favorably on such conduct. (R. 370.) In
Mr. Miller's case, there was no "deal" for his testimony from the prosecution, but after
Mr. Miller's sentencing was moved from just prior to Billy's trial to just after Billy's
trial, the prosecutor in Mr. Miller's criminal case agreed to a 32 day jail term (instead of
the indeterminate prison term she had recommended previously and Adult Probation &
Parole recommended at sentencing) at least in part because of his testimony against Billy
Charles. (R. 370.) The sentencing judge, after hearing about Mr. Miller's cooperation
with the State in this case, and with the prosecutor's agreement, sentenced Mr. Miller to
the lighter sentence. (R. 370.)
The reality of the way the criminal justice system works, as it did in this case, is to
allow a jailhouse informant to get a lighter sentence without there being any formal
"agreement" that he would receive a reduced sentence in exchange for his cooperation
and without requiring the State to make a disclosure about any "deal." (R. 372.) The
practice makes a mockery of disclosure rules16 and a sophisticated criminal like
Mr. Miller would know that if he acted as a jailhouse informant in high profile murder
cases, he was likely to receive a benefit regardless of whether there was a formal "deal."
The requested instruction reflects this reality. It provides that, when assessing credibility,
16

This practice is pervasive. The trial court in this case recognized that benefits for
jailhouse informant testimony are part of the criminal justice system even where there is
no formal deal: "I also thought that his defamiliarity with the system as Mr. Ljungberg
argued was relevant particularly where here this individual was suggesting that no
promises had been made to him for any testimony. And his knowledge of how the
system works in the delays and sentencing, what have you, seems to me his background
and his knowledge of the system was important." (R. 348:23.)
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the jury should consider whether the informant "believed he was likely to receive some
benefit from his cooperation" and that "[a] witness who believes that he may be able to
obtain his own freedom, or receive a lighter sentence by giving testimony favorable to the
prosecution, has motive to testify falsely." The given instruction ignores the serious
implications of the nature of our criminal justice system and the effect that the
informant's belief about a benefit he may receive has on his credibility.
The trial court should have instructed the jury with the requested instruction to
fully advise the jury on the variety of issues—particularly relevant to the testimony of
Troy Miller—that may influence the credibility of a jailhouse informant giving testimony
on behalf of the State. Oklahoma requires such an instruction whenever the testimony of
a jailhouse informant is admitted. The rule was adopted in response to a case with
circumstances similar to those here, i.e., a jailhouse informant acted as a "key witness for
the State5' and the other evidence "was wholly circumstantial." Dodd, 993 P.2d at 783
(recognizing that there were two primary pieces of evidence (i) the jailhouse informant
testimony, and (ii) issues related to the medical examiner's findings). The jailhouse
informant's "credibility was a pivotal issue." Id at 783. There was no "deal" in Dodd
either, but the informant had a "hope" that his testimony would result in a benefit from
the state—the informant getting out of jail. Id at 782. A similar "hope" was expressed
by Troy Miller when he repeatedly called the hotline and claimed to have information
about an unidentified murder case.17

17

In fact, when the detectives approached Mr. Miller to get the information, he initially
began talking about a different case until the detectives identified that they were there to
talk about Billy Charles. (R. 347:131-32.)
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Dodd recognized that "[t]he Constitution of the United States prohibits a jailhouse
informant from testifying as to a defendant's statements when the informant works for
the government and deliberately elicits or coerces statements related to a crime for which
the accused has been indicted." Id. at 783. But the court recognized that in the absence
of state action, "equally insidious reliability problems . . . escape attention." IdL at 784.
The court stated, "[c]onsider the more common example of the informant who does not
work for the government when procuring incriminating statements. . .. [T]here is no
state action and therefore no constitutional concern. But, this distinction matters little in
terms of informant reliability or trustworthiness. Irrespective of whether initially
contacted by the state, most informants relay incriminating statements to the state in
expectation of benefit in exchange." Id. at 784. This scenario and the realities of the
criminal justice system were recognized by the Oklahoma court and should be recognized
by this court—there are "insidious reliability problems" with Troy Miller's testimony, but
the jury was not instructed in a manner to combat these problems.
In response to these realities, the Oklahoma court adopted a procedure to ensure
complete disclosure from the state of information related to the informant18 and required
a comprehensive jury instruction concerning the credibility issues tied to jailhouse
informant testimony. IdL The instruction requested in this case is almost identical to that
required in Oklahoma. A similar instruction should be required whenever jailhouse
informants are used. But at the very least, the instruction was required under the
circumstances here, given Mr. Miller's credibility—his lengthy criminal history, his
| O

While the information identified by the Oklahoma court was eventually provided by
the State, it was only after numerous requests from the defendant and the intervention of
the court. (R. 342:10-15.)
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sophistication with the criminal justice system, the number of cases in which he acted as
an informant, and his belief that he would receive a benefit (which was undisputedly
received in the form of a lighter sentence).19
Just as the error was reversible error in Dodd, so the error is here. Id, at 783, 785.
The case against Billy was not only circumstantial, but it was hanging by a thread. The
State's testimony from Troy Miller offering Billy's "confession" was critical to the case,
at least according to the State, and likely influential on the jury's verdict. If the jury had
been instructed about all of the different aspects to consider in assessing the credibility of
Troy Miller's testimony (rather than simply the existence of an express deal, which did
not exist), there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury may have reached a different
verdict. S.H. v. Bistryski, 923 P.2d 1376, 1382 (Utah 1996). Reversal is warranted.
Conclusion
The court should vacate Billy's conviction because the State violated his due
process rights when (i) it delayed in bad faith for 11 years before charging him with the
crime; and (ii) its investigation of this cold case ignored evidence implicating anyone
other than Billy. Reversal on this ground does not require a new trial.
If the court does not vacate the conviction, it should order a new trial because trial
counsel was constitutionally ineffective in failing (i) to present evidence corroborating
Billy's story about the mechanical problems with his truck and (ii) to call a witness who

19

As the concurrence in Dodd recognized "This case illustrates the problems associated
with the use of jailhouse informants who often play a pivotal role in an accused's
conviction. . .. [W]e must take certain precautions to ensure a citizen is not convicted on
the testimony of an unreliable professional jailhouse informant, or snitch, who routinely
trades dubious information for favors." Dodd, 993 P.2d at 785 (Strubhar, J., specially
concurring).
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placed a third party at the scene of the crime after Billy left for work. The crucial
question was whether Jamie was alive when Billy left for work at 6 a.m. and all of this
evidence, unheard by the jury, is exculpatory.
Finally, a new trial is warranted because the trial court erred when it failed to
instruct the jury properly about the credibility concerns of jailhouse informant testimony.
Troy Miller's testimony about Billy's "confession" was critical for the State in this weak
circumstantial case. There is a reasonable probability that any and all of the errors before
the trial court impacted the jury's verdict.
DATED this 16th day of June, 2010.
SNELL & WILMER L.L.P.
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Katherine Carreau
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
Billy Justin Charles
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3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT

vs.
BILLY JUSTIN CHARLES,
Defendant.

Case No: 071908781 FS
/Judge:
DENO HIMONAS
Date:
October 1, 2009

PRESENT
Clerk:
krisu
Prosecutor: VINCENT B MEISTER
STEPHEN L NELSON
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): ROBIN K LJUNGBERG
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: May 1, 1976
Audio
Tape Number;
S44
Tape Count;

4:02-4:22

CHARGES
1. MURDER - 1st Degree Felony
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 04/02/2009 Guilty
SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant's conviction of MURDER a 1st Degree Felony,
the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not less
than five years and which may be life in the Utah State Prison.
To the SALT LAKE County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the
defendant will be confined.

SENTENCE TRUST
The defendant is to pay the following:
Restitution:
Amount: $25000.00 Plus Interest
Pay in behalf of: VICTIM
The amount of Restitution is to be determined by Board of Pardons,
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Rule 8 0 7 . Other Exceptions.
A statement not .specifically covered by Rule 803 or Rule 804 but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness is
not excluded by the hearsay rule if the court determines that (A) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the
statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can procure through
reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purpose of these rules and the interests of justice will best be served by admission of the
statement into evidence. However, a statement may not be admitted under this exception unless the proponent of it makes known to
the adverse party sufficiently in advance of the trial or hearing to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet
it, the proponent's intention to offer the statement and the particulars of it, including the name and address of the declarant.
Committee Note: This rule transfers identical provisions Rule 803(24) and Rule 804(b)(5) to a new Rule 807 to reflect the
organization found in the Federal Rules of Evidence. No substantive change is intended. This rule is the federal rule, verbatim.
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Amendment 5 - Trial and Punishment, Compensation for Takings. Ratified 12/15/1791.
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or
indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual
service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in
jeopardy of 1ife_or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public
use, without just compensation.
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Amendment 6 - Right to Speedy Trial, Confrontation of Witnesses. Ratified 12/15/1791.
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of
the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the
witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defence.
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Amendment 14 - Citizenship Rights. Ratified 7/9/1868. Note History
1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the
United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due_j>rocess of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.
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INSTRUCTION NO.

You have heard testimony from a witness who may be classified as a "jailhouse
informer". The law allows the use of such testimony. However; the testimony of an
informer who provides evidence against a defendant must be examined and weighed by
you with greater care than the testimony of an ordinary witness. Whether the informer's
testimony has been affected by interest or prejudice against the defendant is for you to
determine. In making that determination, you should consider:
(1)

whether the informer has received anything (including leniency
in prosecution, personal advantage, or vindication) in exchange
for testimony;

(2)

other cases, and the number of other cases, in which the
informer testified or offered statements against another,
whether those statements are being used, and whether the
informer received any deal, promise, inducement, or benefit in
exchange for that testimony or statement; or believed he was
likely to receive some benefit from his cooperation;

(3)

whether the informer has ever changed his or her testimony;

(4)

the criminal history of the informant, not just limited to number
of convictions, but also the level of sophistication gained
through the informer's experience in the criminal justice
system; and

(5)

any other evidence related to the informer's credibility.
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In sum, you should look at all of the evidence in deciding what credence and what
weight, if any, you would want to give to the jailhouse informer.
You should bear in mind that a witness who has entered into such an agreement
with the government may have an interest in the case different than any ordinary witness.
A witness who believes that he may be able to obtain his own freedom, or receive a
lighter sentence by giving testimony favorable to the prosecution, has motive to testify
falsely. Therefore, you must examine his testimony with caution and weigh it with great
care. If, after scrutinizing his testimony, you decide to accept it, you may give it whatever
weight, if any, you find it deserves.
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INSTRUCTION NO. 44

The testimony of an in-custody informant should be viewed with caution and close scrutiny. In
evaluating this testimony, you should consider the extent to which it may have been influenced
by the receipt of, or expectation of, any benefits from the party calling that witness. This does
not mean that you may arbitrarily disregard this testimony, but you should give it the weight to
which you find it to be entitled in the light of all the evidence in this case.
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SLCDA * Discovery * Further Dissemination Prohibited * 23

SLSO Case Number:
95-10788
Homicide

AFFIDAVIT

I, Trooper Wayne A. Smith of the Utah Highway Patrol, Commercial Vehicle Safety and
Inspection Bureau, was requested by Detective Kris Ownby to examine a black 1972 Pord pickup,
Utah License Plate 048 JLS.
I inspected this vehicle on August 23, 1996 at 14:30 hours at the Salt Lake County shops.
During my inspection, I discovered that the vehicle could be started in gear, as the neutral safety
switch had been disabled. The vehicle can also be started on an incline, and roll backwards, while
in drive at a slow idle and then go forward.
I performed all of the items listed above by myself, with no assistance. I found that I
could shift the gears from either under the hood or by going under the vehicle and moving the
1 inkage.

THE ABOVE STATEMENTS ARE TRUE AND CORRECT FROM THE FINDINGS
OF MY INVESTIGATION.

Trooper Wayne A. Snfith, #035
Utah Highway Patrol
Commercial Vehicle Safety and Inspection Bureau
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